Saying Goodbye... По-русски

I haven't done a Russian blog post in quite a while, so today we're going to talk about how to say "Goodbye" in Russian.  This is important, because, well, words mean things.

Even in Russian.

When you're saying goodbye to someone, the terms you use convey specific meanings.  Saying a full goodbye in English tends to have a definitive connotation, and is often used in a less-than-positive light.

The shorter and much more common use is a simple 'bye.  This is fairly universal and the connotations of its use depend completely on context, intonation and non-verbal cues.

Other phrases, like "See you later," or it's short form of "Later," and any of the myriad variations are generally positive and often used with familiarity, or even sincerity.  If you aren't actually going to see that person later, then you are expressing the desire nonetheless.

In Russian, you say До свидания (Do sviDAnya).  This literally means until our next meeting, but is used as good bye.  However, it does not carry the finality that the English good bye does, and is used commonly, especially in formal or unfamiliar settings.

The much more formal and temporary parting is Пока! (PokA).  This literally means "until", but comes from the concept of пока не увидимся, or until we meet again.  This is used among friends and in familiar and informal situations.  Akin to English 'bye.

Пока!

The last part of the long form above, Увидимся (ooVEEdemsya), is the Russian equivalent of "see you later."  Literally it means we'll see each other (Verb, conjugated for we, with reflexive ending).  The response can either be a a repeat Увидимся or a Пока, which carries essentially the same meaning.

Увидимся с электричкой

To say one's goodbyes would be Прощаться (proschATsya), or попрощаться (poproschATsya).  So, if you wanted to say, "tomorrow we'll say our goodbyes" it would be Завтра мы попрощаемся.

Тяжолое прощание...

Удачи!

Spiritual Lessons from the War Chapters 2: Don't Leave your Stronghold

Last week I left Sunday's post with a to be continued... Today's post continues last week's lesson, with another example. If you recall, last week we talked about how Amalickiah lured Lehonti off the mountain by asking him to come down "just a little."  This started off the string of events which led to Lehonti's death, the murder of the Lamanite king, and Amalickiah becoming the king.  With Amalickiah as king, the Lamanites began their war against the Nephites.

After Teancum's DEVGRU-style assassination of Amalickiah, the Lamanites realize they're in a bit of a pickle and Amalickiah's brother, Ammoron, orders the Lamanites to "maintain those cities, which they had taken by the shedding of blood." (Alma 52:4) The cities they had taken were Nephite cities, which had been built up into strongholds by Moroni, using a robust system of earth and wood-works. The Lamanites had payed dearly for the strongholds they were able to capture, and the Nephites understood how difficult it would be to recapture them.  In an area the Nephites called Boutiful, Teancum "thougth it was not expedient that he should attempt to attack the Lamanites in their forts." (Alma 52:5,6) So Teancum's army dug themselves in and waited for either an opportunity, or reinforcements.

An artist rendition of Moroni's city fortifications

 Fortifications at Becan, Mexico, which follow the pattern of Moroni's fortifications

While waiting, Moroni sent orders to Teancum to attack and recapture one of the occupied cities, named Mulek.  Unfortunately Teancum sees that "it was impossible that he could overpower them while they were in their fortifications." (Alma 52:17) Teancum goes back to the drawing board, and Moroni arrives with reinforcements.  Moroni, Teancum and a number of other leaders hold a Recapture Mulek Working Group, and decide they need to get the Lamanites to come out of the city and then attack.

They try first by sending representatives to Mulek, asking the Lamanite captain, Jacob, to come out and meet them on the plains for battle.  Jacob says thanks, but no thanks and stays in the stronghold.
"Moroni, having no hopes of meeting them upon fair grounds, therefore, he resolved upon a plan that he might decoy the Lamanites out of their strongholds." (Alma 52:21) The plan involved Teancum taking a small group and march out in the open, baiting the Lamanite army, while Moroni's army would hide and then recapture the city when the Lamanites were out chasing Teancum.

Here we see how important our strongholds in life can be.  Teancum could have attacked Mulek, and would have probably inflicted some measure of damage on the Lamanites, but it was "impossible that he could overpower them" while they held fast in the stronghold.  In our lives we have our own strongholds.  The Church, the priesthood, and the Gospel.  Our families and our faith.  They can be strong, and they can be weak, depending on the amount of effort we put into building up the fortifications.  Regardless of their condition, though, they are our strongholds, and so long as we hold to them, Satan cannot overpower us.  It doesn't mean we will escape uninjured, but we will remain alive.

Satan understands this, and uses his own strategems and ruses to try and bait us out of our strongholds, where he can have hopes of meeting us on fair grounds.  Much like Moroni and Teancum, Satan knows that to get us out of our strongholds, he needs to use bait that is seemingly both minor enough to keep us in our comfort zone, but lucrative enough to make the risks worth the effort.  This may be through an improper friendship with someone other than our spouse.  It may be with recreational substances, things that only break the word of wisdom just a little.  It may be with groups of desired friends or coworkers.  It may be with financial and worldly success.  Regardless, Satan will place a small, but enticing temptation clearly in front of you, while hiding his own armies in the forests to the side.

Teancum and his men go out, and Jacob sees them and thinks, "they're not that far away, and there aren't very many of them..." The Lamanites kit up and set out after Teancum, "supposing by their numbers to overpower Teancum because of the smallness of his numbers." (Alma 52:23) Teancum sees that the Lamanites took the bait, and they pick up a double-time.  The Lamanites see this and think Teancum's group is now scared, which just gets the Lamanites going even faster.  At this point, the Lamanites have swallowed the bait hook, line and sinker. If we recall the capabilities of Teancum's army, we feel somewhat sorry for the gullible Lamanites. 

This is where Satan's baits really get us.  Just like a fishing hook has a barb on the end, so that it just keeps sinking in deeper.  When we go after that small temptation, thinking, "it's nothing, really," we find that it feels good, maybe exhilarating, maybe liberating.  We enjoy the thrill of the chase.  We enjoy the rush that comes from bending the rules and pushing the line.  But our stronghold is still right there behind us, we can still see it, and the prize is just up ahead, running scared!  But Satan's temptation will always be able to out run us, just as Teancum's superior soldiers could the Lamanites.  The short-lived exhilaration, the brief high, the thrill of a look or a tease, leaves us wanting more.  So we quicken our march toward our prize, each second further and further away from our stronghold. 

With the Lamanites out of Mulek, Moroni's army attacks and quickly renders the minimal protection force ineffective.  Moroni then leaves some of his army in Mulek to maintain the city, and takes the rest and marches in pursuit of the Lamanite army.  Little did the Lamanites know, Teancum was leading them into a trap, where Lehi and his army stood waiting.  We'll talk about Lehi more on another day, but he had a particular reputation among the Lamanites, and when Jacob's army learned that Teancum and Lehi were together ahead of them, "they fled in much confusion, lest perhaps they should not obtain the city Mulek before Lehi should overtake them." (Alma 52:28)

Suddenly the temptation was too big for them to control, the thrill and exhilaration gone and the realization of their predicament was clear.  They had let themselves get a long way from their strongholds.

The brilliance of Moroni's plan, was that he knew the Lamanites would turn tail and run at the sight of both Lehi and Teancum together, and he planned to meet them unexpectedly as they raced for their stronghold.   But what Jacob didn't know what that in leaving his stronghold, he allowed Moroni to capture it, and that he was racing into Moroni's army.  Jacob and the Lamanites had no sanctuary, and were now under assault from much stronger forces.  Then, when the Lamanites were decisively engaged with Moroni, Lehi and Teancum would attack from their rear, encircling and destroying them.  The Lamanites fought furiously for their lives, but in the end, they were either killed or captured.

This is the trap Satan lays for us.  We think we're leaving our strongholds for something small but safe.  Instead, a much greater force awaits to ambush us as we find ourselves further and further from our strongholds.  And while we're gone, our strongholds themselves are spoiled as part of the plot, and all because we thought we could go out and back quickly.  In the end, just like the Lamanites, if we take Satan's baits and leave our strongholds, we will find ourselves in his hands.  His is a long con, though.  The first few times he may even allow us to catch the bait, to boost our confidence and lull us into a false sense of security.  But just as Lehonti thought he was in control, all the while being poisoned by Amalickiah, and Jacob who thought he was in control while Teancum teased them along toward Lehi, when we leave our strongholds, we are never in control.

These two tactical engagement, given in great detail, were included in Mormon's abridgement of the records for a reason.  Remember, Mormon chose very carefully what to include, and there is nothing idle in the Book of Mormon.  So, don't come down from your mountains, and don't leave your strongholds!

Centers of Gravity

For those of you who have been reading this blog for a little bit, you might remember my post about ends, ways and means... and bacon.  Well, now that we're out of the world of C500 Tactics, we're in C400 Joint Operations. (Don't ask why C500 comes before C400.  It was probably done that way because some SAMS dude used Jedi Design when creating the course)

This means we're back to ends, ways, means, but not in the same way as before.  Now we're using ends ways and means to determine Centers of Gravity.  Neither black holes, nor the center of the earth are considered centers of gravity, though they may argue with that.  Also, they're not the same thing as center of mass type of center of gravity; the kind you wish had been lower in your 1997 Ford Explorer. 

No, it's not like this...

What a center of gravity is, according to the very dead Carl von Clausewitz, is the "source of all power" and the one thing you have to destroy to defeat your enemy.  Kind of like the One Ring.  So, when you're trying to divine your enemy's center of gravity, just imagine whichever thing they might be cooing "My Preciousssss!" over.  That will probably be it.

Maybe more like this...?

 

Did you know that in order to determine your own and your enemy's center of gravity, you can use ends, ways and means?  You probably can't use bacon, but it may help you think better because you won't be hungry.  That being said, you need to first, determine both your and your enemy's ends.  Then you need to figure out the ways that you both could achieve those ends, and then determine the means available to conduct the ways.  (Remember, ways = verbs, ends = nouns)

*FLASHBACK*

So, let's imagine that you wake up Saturday morning to discover your spouse made breakfast.  Unfortunately you soon discover that your kids ate all the bacon, and this just will not do. What is the ultimate problem?  You don't get any bacon.  What is the ultimate solution to this problem?  You getting some bacon.  So, this will be your End - Get some bacon.

What are the possible Ways you can make this happen?
You can throw a fit like a two-year old, screaming "I want my bacon!"
You can bribe your spouse to go get you more bacon and cook it.
You can call your neighbor to see if they have bacon to give you.
You can go to the store and buy more bacon.

What resources (Means) do you have/need to execute your ways?
Transportation to get to the store
Money to buy bacon/bribe spouse
A phone to contact a friend or neighbor
A stove and pan to cook your bacon

*END FLASHBACK*

We've determined our end.  Now, let's analyze our ways.  Throwing a fit probably won't get us anything. Out. Bribing our spouse to go get and cook us more bacon probably won't work either, because they've got to get the kids to swimming lessons.  Out.  We could call our neighbor, but we run the risk of them not having bacon, or not being willing to give it to us.  Out.  That leaves going to the store and buying us bacon. (both verbs, see)

From our means, we have to determine which are necessary for us to enact our way and achieve our end. A phone is useless.  A stove to cook bacon is needed, so as to avoid salmonella and other food borne diseases. Transportation is also needed to get us to the store.  Money is important as well.  But do any of these things actually provide us with bacon?  NO!  We need a store that sells bacon.

All of these things equal critical factors: Critical Capabilities (things you have to be able to do/provide), Critical Requirements (things you have to have to do those things) and Critical Vulnerabilities (things you need, but can easily be taken away).  So, our critical requirement is procuring bacon.  Our critical capabilities are transportation, money to purchase, and a stuff to cook with.  Our critical vulnerabilities are sufficient money, gas in our car, and store hours.

Of our means available, we need to validate which is our true center of gravity, by doing what Joe Strange and Dale Eikmeier tell us and determine "does/uses" criteria.   The true center of gravity "does" what our end state is.  All our other requirements are "used" by the "doer" to achieve our end state. Since our end state is getting bacon, we have already determined that our center of gravity is the store.  All the other things are "used" to achieve our end state, but cannot actually achieve it.

End State Achieved!

There you are!  Now you, too, can determine centers of gravity.

The Commander's Role in the Operations Process

The other day in class we were learning about the commander's role in the operations process.  Now, I understand that this is getting in to unfiltered doctrine, here, but there'll be a youtube clip coming up to help keep us from losing our sanity.

So, within the operations process (how the Army plans and then does the things it does), the commander has specific roles, other than to stand around and supervise.  That may come as a surprise to some, but it's true... at least doctrinally.  The commanders role is to lead and assess by understanding, visualizing, describing and directing.  The figure below is one of the Army's convoluted ways of trying to visually depict this role.

Since I understand that reading doctrine and looking at Army doctrinal figures isn't the most entertaining way of grasping this idea, here's a clip that sums everything up quite well:



In this clip, when Buford and his cavalry arrived at Gettysburg he immediately understood the situation.  He understood the environment and how it would impact the coming battle, and fully understood the problem facing him and the Union in general.
Buford could visualize the battle unfolding as if before his eyes, and could see his own end state - what needed to happen.  He could see the results of not succeeding.
He then described both the situation as it would be if they were unsuccessful, and what his own cavalry needed to do, including their end state - deny Lee the high ground until Meade's army could arrive.  He described the desired effect.
Finally, Buford then directs his troops as to what they were to do.  But he didn't give detailed commands, he described his intent and what his end state was, and then told his men to execute.

Who knew doctrine could be so easy?

A Spiritual Lesson from the War Chapters 1: Don't Come Down From Your Mountain

This Sunday I'm going to do a little plagiarizing/paraphrasing of one of the lessons presented by John Bytheway from the Book of Mormon's war chapters.  Because I believe that each and every lesson given in these chapters has a direct application to our lives, whether we are in the military or not, I believe that the detailed tactical information Mormon chose to include is there for a specific reason.  The spiritual lessons we'll look at today are an example of how we can apply these lessons to our lives, and are an example of how we can "liken the scriptures" to our own lives.

DON'T COME DOWN FROM YOUR MOUNTAIN

Background: After Moroni's victory over Zarahemnah, a new group of dissenters rose up among the Nephites.  This group, "lifted up on their hearts because of their exceedingly great riches," (Alma 45:24) was led by Amalickiah, "a large and a strong man" who "was desirous to be a king; and these people... were also desirous that he should be their king." (Alma 46:3,4).  They governmental system among the Nephites had for many years been a system of elected judges, and based on individual freedom and liberty.  Amalickiah wanted to be king because he wanted control over people.  Not just the Nephites, but anyone he could get control over.

An artist's rendition of Amalickiah

Moroni sees the threat of Amalickiah and his movement, and takes measures against Amalickiah's followers, but Amalickiah and his most loyal followers realize that their future among the Nephites will not end well, and "fearing that he should not gain the point, he took those of his people who would and departed into the land of Nephi," where the Lamanites were.  Moroni tries to stop them, but Amalickiah and "a small number of his men" escaped.

Now living among the Lamanites, Amalickiah immediately goes to work "and did stir up the Lamanites to anger against the people of Nephi, insomuch that the king of the Lamanites sent a proclamation throughout all his land, among all his people, that they should gather themselves together again to go to battle against the Nephites."  Unfortunately for the Lamanite king, a good number of his soldiers remembered what happened to Zarahemnah, and "feared to go to battle against the Nephites lest they should lose their lives."  "And it came to pass that they would not, or the more part of them would not, obey the commandments of the king."

So, the king gets mad, and gives Amalickiah command over the Lamanites who would be obedient, which is exactly what Amalickiah wants - power over people.  "Now behold, this was the desire of Amalickiah; for he being a very subtle man to do evil therefore he laid the plan in his heart to dethrone the king of the Lamanites."  By thinking that he had power over Amalickiah, the king began giving away his power to his enemy.  Amalickiah's next goal was to gain control over the Lamanites who would not obey the king.

Those Lamanites had bugged out and took up a defensive position at the top of a mountain called Antipus, thinking that the obedient Lamanites were coming to fight them.  But Amalickiah wanted "to gain favor with the armies of the Lamanites, that he might place himself at their head and dethrone the king and take possession of the kingdom." Amalickiah sets up camp at the base of the mountain, and sends "a secret embassy" up to the leader of the Lamanites at the top, named Lehonti, and asks Lehonti to come down to the camp to speak with Amalickiah.  "And it came to pass that when Lehonti received the message he durst not go down to the foot of the mountain."  Lehonti knew that it was suicide to go down, and his group was "fixed in their minds with a determined resolution" not to go to war with the Nephites.  Amalickiah sends his people up a second and third time, each time getting the "fixed with a determined resolution" answer of "no."

An artist's rendition of Lehonti

The fourth time Amalickiah himself goes up, almost to the camp, and asks Lehonti to come down, and to even bring his guards with him.  The determined resolution proved less fixed when Lehonti only had to go down a little, feeling secure with his guards.  Amalickiah proposes that Lehonti's army surrounds his own army at night, and in the morning, they would surrender to Lehonti. 

We often find ourselves in our spiritual defensive positions at the top of the Gospel mountain.  It is up here that we ourselves are "fixed in our minds with a determined resolution" not to come down from our mountain.  How many times do we look at the major sins and say things like, "I'll never do that"?  "I'll never start drinking or smoking." "I'm never going to have an affair." "I wouldn't ever get into drugs or pornography."  Sounds pretty easy that way, and just like Lehonti, we know better than to go down to the spiritual Amalickiah waiting to destroy us.  We know, just like Lehonti knew, that Amalickiah was there to destroy us.  But then Amalickiah comes UP to US, and says, "Come down, just a little."  "Don't worry, you can bring your guards, you'll be safe."  "I don't want to hurt you, I actually want to be your servant.  I want to give YOU the power." We read as Lehonti actually goes down, thinking, "Doofus! You knew who he was, and you went anyway?" 

But when Satan comes up to us and says, "Come down, just a little," do we listen?  When he says, "Young women, I'm not asking you to break the law of chastity.  I'm just saying that if you dress less modestly, boys will find you more attractive." "Young men, I'm not asking you to break the law of chastity.  I'm just saying that it's perfectly innocent to buy that Maxim, or the SI swimsuit edition." "Yeah, sure it's a rated R movie, but it's just because of a few swear words.  Otherwise it would totally be PG-13" "Yeah, this movie's pushing some boundaries, but hey, it's still PG-13, right?  So it's still just fine." "You know, the prophet asked you not to have more than one piercing in your ear, and no body piercings, but he's really kind of old, and he doesn't really get what's in style today.  A fashionable little diamond nose stud is plenty conservative." "I'm not asking you to stop going to church, I'm just saying that stake conference isn't really sacrament meeting, so if you go golfing instead, you're not actually missing anything."

He even asks us to bring our guards and feel secure. "You're a mature adult, you're strong enough to handle this." "As the designated driver, you can even get free sodas at the bar." "Yeah, the dress is strapless, but you look so good in it." "Everyone swears a little.  Sometimes you just need to vent." "Your shirts cover up the belly button piercing, so no one will even know it's there." "The girls in the pictures still have some clothing on, so it's not really pornography." The great lie here is that Satan wants us to think that we're still in charge, and that we're still safe.  Is Satan a different being because he was willing to come up to us?  No. We still know who he is and what he wants.

The condition was that Amalickiah would become second in command to Lehonti. Lehonti agrees, surrounds Amalickiah's army, they surrender and Amalickiah becomes second in command.  "Now this was the very thing which Amalikciah desired." "Now it was the custom among the Lamanites, if their chief leader was killed, to appoint the second leader to be their chief leader."

"And it came to pass that Amalickiah caused that one of his servants should administer poison by degrees to Lehonti, that he died."

This is what happens to us.  When we agree to "come down, just a little" we get ourselves ensnared in the trap.  We feel secure and empowered.  We feel safe.  We feel like we were in command.  Just like Lehonti felt like he was in command all the way up till the point that he died.  Isn't it interesting that Amalickiah didn't order his servant to just kill Lehonti?  He ordered him to be poisoned, by degrees.  Lehonti slowly died, never knowing what had happened to him.  In the same way Satan will poison us, by degrees, once we come down from our own mountain.  We will continue to think we're in charge, that we're safe, and that we're doing what's right, all the way up until we find ourselves taking that drink, watching that movie, or in a situation where we can no longer resist that affair.  Very rarely does anyone go from the top of the mountain to the enemy camp below in one step.  Instead, we get lured out, little by little.

So, the lesson of this section: Seize and retain the high ground! Don't come down from your mountain!

To be continued...

FSA trading arty with SAA

Saw this earlier today.  The Syrian civil war is, if nothing else, providing some really, really interesting combat footage.

This clip is of an FSA gun crew firing on Syrian Army positions on the visible horizon (the camera guy zooms in with each shot).

Things start getting interesting at 2:37, when the first rounds from the Syrian gun crews start landing.  I've got to give it to this gun crew, they just keep on gunning on like it was nothing.

Book of Mormon Leader Profile: Teancum

Today is the second post in my series of lessons from the war chapters of the Book of Mormon. One of the things we've been discussing in our classes is leader ethics, and unfortunately right now, the US military (and the Army in particular) isn't doing so well when it comes to ethical behavior in senior leaders.  The downfall of GEN Petraeus was especially hard on many in the Army who had come to view him as their idol and example.  Fortunately, we have the examples of a few of the military leaders in the Book of Mormon to look to.  Today will be the first in a series of four leader profiles from the war chapters.

An artists rendition of Teancum (Derengio7 at DeviantArt)

This is Teancum (tee-An-cum).  While we don't know a lot about Teancum's personal history (he isn't even mentioned until well Alma 50:35), we can infer that he was one of Moroni's best military leaders, and a warrior to the core.  But even more, he was an extremely bold warrior and leader.  In Alma 50, Teancum's army is dispatched to stop a group of dissenting Nephites from joining the Lamanites.  When Morianton, the leader of the dissenters, convinces his group to fight, Teancum's army soundly defeats them and Teancum kills Morianton himself. 

The following year, when an internal rebellion threatens the Nephite government, Moroni is forced to use his armies to restore governmental order.  Adding to Moroni's urgency, the Lamanite armies begin a major campaign against the Nephites. "Behold, it came to pass that while Moroni was thus breaking down the wars and contentions among his own people, and subjecting them to peace and civilization, and making regulations to prepare for war against the Lamanites, behold, the Lamanites had come into the land of Moroni, which was in the borders by the seashore." (Alma 51:22) 

Just as before, Moroni chose Teancum and his army to stop the Lamanite advance.  The reason Moroni chose Teancum is spelled out, "for they were great warriors; for every man of Teancum did exceed the Lamanites in their strength and in their skill of war, insomuch that they did gain advantage over the Lamanites." (Alma 51:31)  So we see, when military emergencies emerge, Moroni sends Teancum's army first, because of their abilities. Implied here is that Teancum, as a leader, has expertly trained and prepared his soldiers for combat.  Especially over the next decade, the ability of our military leaders to ensure their soldiers are trained and prepared for combat will become more important than ever.

We then get a glimpse of Teancum's personal qualities as a leader and warrior: after fighting all day, the Nephites and Lamanites set up camp to rest.  Teancum, who knew that the Lamanite leader was a Nephite dissenter named Amalickiah, understood that Amalickiah was the cause of this war and decided to act on that knowledge:
"And it came to pass that when the night had come, Teancum and his servant stole forth and went out by night, and went into the camp of Amalickiah; and behold, sleep had overpowered them because of their much fatigue, which was caused by the labors and heat of the day.  And it came to pass that Teancum stole privily into the tent of the king, and put a javelin to his heart; and he did cause the death of the king immediately that he did not awake his servants.  And he returned again privily to his own camp..." (Alma 51:33,34).

Teancum saw the opportunity and conducted his own special operation to kill the Lamanite king, successfully infiltrated the Lamanite camp, found the King, killed him without waking anyone, and then exfilled the camp unharmed.  I'd say that's pretty audacious and bold, and he did it without super stealth Blackhawks or NVGs.  If a SOF soldier were looking for a good example to emulate, Teancum should definitely be high on the list. 

At this point, Teancum gets back to his camp, and not only does he not call ENDEX, but again displays his leadership and warrior skills: "...and behold, his men were asleep, and he awoke them and told them all the things that he had done.  And he caused that his armies should stand in readiness, lest the Lamanites had awakened and should come upon them." (Alma 51:35,36)  When the Lamanites wake up, find the air let out of their king, and see Teancum's army ready to fight, they conduct a hasty retrograde into the cities they'd already captured.

When it becomes obvious that the Lamanites aren't coming out of the strongholds, who does Moroni turn to?  Teancum, whose army plays a vital role in decoying the Lamanites out the strongholds. (Alma 52)  Unfortunately, just prior to the end of this particular war, Teancum makes an attempt to repeat his killing of Amalickiah, and sneaks into the Lamanite camp, finds tent of Ammoron (Amalickiah's brother, coincidentally) and lets the air out of him as well.  Only this time Teancum made two mistakes, the first being that "he did go forth in his anger" (Alma 62:36) and second that he didn't kill Ammoron instantly, but "behold, the king did awaken his servants before he died, insomuch that they did pursue Teancum, and slew him." (Alma 62:36)  Teancum's death hit Moroni and Lehi pretty hard, "for behold, he had been a man who had fought valiantly for his country, yea, a true friend to liberty." (Alma 62:37) Had Teancum not gone "in his anger," maybe he would have been a bit more careful when poking holes.  But, this also serves as a lesson that even great warriors can, and often do, die in war.

I especially love the example of Teancum because of his boldness, audacity and professionalism.  In fact, I would say that he is my favorite of the Nephite commanders.  Unfortunately I think both he and Lehi take a backstage to Moroni and Helaman, because their stories are somewhat muted.  But when it comes to warrior examples, these men fit the bill perfectly.

Electricity: The Army's Institutional Meth

Let’s face it, the Army is an energy hog.  In 2007 the amount of fuel required per soldier simply for electrical energy generation was approximately 10 gallons a day.[1]  When coupled with the fact that in 2007 there were 172,000 service members deployed, the amount of fuel needed for electrical generation is staggering.[2]  This should not be a surprise, though, as everything the Army does relies on electricity.  The walls and duty stations of our tactical operations centers glow with large-screen digital map displays, computer stations, and radio stacks.  When our soldiers leave the wire they carry a wide assortment of electronic gadgets necessary for their missions.  Our army runs on electricity.  Unfortunately, sustaining necessary amounts of electricity is difficult, as illustrated by the above fuel statistic.  The capability to generate and sustain required electrical energy is currently the Army’s most critical energy vulnerability.  Without electricity, the Army simply cannot operate.  As long as the Army struggles to provide sufficient electrical generation, or has to rely on outside sources for its electricity, it remains vulnerable.  The primary vulnerabilities include a reliance on often unreliable civil power infrastructure, a reliance on petroleum fuel for operational and expeditionary power generation, and a reliance on weight-intensive battery power which overburdens the warfighter.  The Army must address these vulnerabilities, whether through electrical self-reliance initiatives or emerging technologies.

 What TOCs used to look like

What TOCs look like now

 

The Army differentiates its energy requirements by dividing them into two categories: operational energy, which is “the energy and associated systems, information and processes required to train, move and sustain forces and systems for military operations,” and garrison energy, which is “the energy required to power Army bases and conduct Soldier training.”[3]  While they may differ in their outcomes, both operational and garrison energy are strikingly similar in requirements, especially when it comes to electrical energy.  Whether operational or garrison, the Army requires electrical energy to power its infrastructure.  This infrastructure includes necessary command systems networked across the globe between “garrison” training locations and “operational” forward headquarters.  It includes the power necessary for housing and sustaining the soldiers and families of Fort Irwin, as well as the power necessary for housing and sustaining the joint force and contractors at Bagram Air Base.  It includes the energy needed to charge the Fort Bragg Military Police’s trunked radio network as well as the energy needed to charge Able Company, 1-506 IN’s tactical radios at COP Yahyah Kheyl, Afghanistan. Whether needed for garrison or facility infrastructure, major systems, or for powering a soldier’s PVS-14s, the Army either has to generate that energy itself, or rely on an outside party for its generation.

Currently the Army relies on established power grids, mechanical power generation and battery power to meet its needs.  For “garrison” or “enduring infrastructure” power needs, the Army ties in to local power grids, often relying on the local civil power infrastructure.  Depending on the location of the installation, this power could come from a number of sources and could be at any state of functionality.  While the Army is moving towards energy independence for garrison power needs, the current method of electrical redundancy remains the use of back-up emergency generators, designed for only short-term use to power critical systems and capabilities.

Mechanical power generation refers to the use of combustion type engines and generators to produce electrical power.  This is the primary power generation method employed towards “operational” energy needs for systems and mobile infrastructure, and is almost entirely dependent on petroleum fuels.  Petroleum fuels have several shortcomings, including their non-renewable nature, the large amount of fuel needed to generate power, and the constant need to transport fuel from depot to end user.  The transportation of fuel to operational locations is costly in both blood and treasure, with over 3,000 personnel killed transporting fuel between 2003 and 2007.[4]  In addition to security concerns, simple variables such as weather and terrain affect the Army’s ability to deliver fuel to users to ensure electrical power.

For soldiers and their individual systems, generators and power grids cannot be carried around the battlefield, and are therefore not an option when conducting operations.  Today’s soldier carries a significant amount of electronics, and relies on battery power to ensure those electronics are functioning.[5]  But batteries, like power grids and generators, have significant limitations.  While some batteries are rechargeable, a separate power source is required to complete a recharge.  Most batteries remain single-use, and often electronics drain battery power completely after more than 6-8 hours of usage, causing the soldier to carry back-up batteries.  As well, batteries are subject to environmental conditions, with extreme cold and heat diminishing battery life.  Most importantly, though, is the problem of battery weight and soldier fighting loads:[6]

Compared to aircraft or ground vehicles, for example, a Warfighter on a three-day foot patrol in Afghanistan has a relatively small demand for energy, but that demand has been growing. Today, that Warfighter may carry more than 33 batteries, weighing up to 10 pounds, to power critical gear. By 2012, battery loads for the same mission are projected to increase to more than 50 batteries per soldier, weighing nearly 18 lbs.[7]

According to guidelines in ADRP 3-90, the more a soldier’s fighting load exceeds 30 percent of bodyweight, the less effective the soldier becomes in combat, especially past 45 percent bodyweight, or approximately 72 pounds[8].  Thus, a soldier’s batteries may comprise as much as 25 to 50 percent of his total fighting load.  As we add new technologies and new systems, this load will likely only increase, while the load bearing capacity of the soldier will only remain static.

How many more toys can we fit on this soldier?

The demand for technology-based operations is entrenched within the Army, and rightfully so.  Current and developing technologies enhance the Army’s inherent capabilities and give it a significant battlefield overmatch over adversaries.  But installations dependent on civil electrical infrastructure are vulnerable to natural outages, attacks on critical power infrastructure and even local and regional economic considerations.[9]  Operationally, should an enemy be able to interdict supply routes and convoys, or even destroy operational fuel storage facilities, the Army would be significantly degraded in its ability to conduct operations.[10]  Finally, the operational effectiveness of the Army ultimately resides in the ability of the soldier to close with and destroy the enemy.  If our soldiers are carrying fighting loads of over 45 percent bodyweight, a quarter of which is batteries, their effectiveness in closing with and destroying the enemy is dramatically degraded and the risk of soldier loss is dramatically increased. 

The Army is coming to terms with its dependence on electrical energy, and recognizes the serious vulnerability presented by that dependence.  While there is no single set of solutions available to completely rid the Army of its energy vulnerability, there are several options available which can significantly mitigate that vulnerability.  Regarding garrison and infrastructure energy requirements, the Army is moving towards a “Net Zero” goal which would make installations fully self-sufficient through the use of self-contained micro grids, developing solar technologies, and even potential nuclear power options.[11]  At some installations such as Ft. Irwin, Ft. Bliss and Ft. Hood, the Army has made significant investments in solar technologies as a means of achieving electrical self-sufficiency.[12] For operational systems and infrastructure, the Army is evaluating similar alternatives, including solar-energy-generating coatings for equipment and waste-to-energy processes.[13]  For soldier power solutions, the Army is also evaluating solar technologies as well as thermoelectric and motion-induction alternatives, as well as developing lighter and better battery technologies.[14]  Throughout the next decade the Army will likely see advancements in electrical generation technologies, but will doubtfully see significant benefit until the 2020s and into the 2030s.  Until then, the Army will continue to expend vast resources to protect and ensure its electrical energy sources, whether they be regional power grids or petroleum fuel sources and volatile supply lines, and ask its soldiers to bear ever-increasing loads of batteries; because the Army knows that without that electricity, it will not function.

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[1] Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), US ArmyPower and Energy StrategyWhite Paper (US Army Research, Development and Engineering Command, Ft. Monroe, VA, 2010) 2.

[2] While the number given here is deployed servicemembers versus deployed soldiers, the comparison is arguably still valid.  The amount of electricity required to support a deployed sailor versus that required to support the deployed soldier sitting next to him in a joint TOC is equal.  Deployed troop numbers as reported to Congress, see Amy Belasco, Troop Levelsin the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues, (Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C, 2009) 9, Table 1.

[3] The United States Army 2012 Posture Statement (Headquarters, United States Army, 2012) 9.

[4] Energy for the Warfighter: Operational Energy Strategy (US Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 2011) 5.

[5] See Steve Mapes, Soldier Power to the Edge (US Army, PM Soldier, PEO Soldier, 2012) 9.

[6] Ibid, 7.

[7] Energy for the Warfighter: Operational Energy Strategy, 4.

[8] Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-90, Offense and Defense (US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Ft. Monroe, VA, 2012) 3-11, Paragraph 3-65.

[9] The United States Army 2012 Posture Statement, 9.

[10] Ibid, 9.

[11] See the Samuel Booth, et al, Net Zero Energy Military Installations: AGuide to Assessment and Planning (US Department of Energy, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2010); for a more in-depth look at possible net zero energy solutions, see ARCIC, US ArmyPower and Energy Strategy White Paper, 12.

[12] The Ft. Irwin solar power system is still under development and anticipated to begin producing electricity this year, with an expected output of over 500MW, see Fort Irwin Solar Energy Enhanced Use Lease Fact Sheet (US Army Corps of Engineers and Clark Energy Group, 2011);.  Fort Bliss and Fort Hood are taking smaller measures, installing solar panels throughout the installations. See Kate Galbraith, At Fort Bliss and Fort HoodGoing Solar for Net Zero Energy Production (New York Times, 26 April, 2012).

[13] ARCIC, US Army Power and Energy Strategy White Paper, 12.

[14] Ibid, 23. Also, Mapes, Soldier Power to the Edge, 15-22.