Let’s face it, the Army is an energy
hog. In 2007 the amount of fuel required
per soldier simply for electrical energy generation was approximately 10
gallons a day.[1] When coupled with the fact that in 2007 there
were 172,000 service members deployed, the amount of fuel needed for electrical
generation is staggering.[2] This should not be a surprise, though, as everything
the Army does relies on electricity. The
walls and duty stations of our tactical operations centers glow with
large-screen digital map displays, computer stations, and radio stacks. When our soldiers leave the wire they carry a
wide assortment of electronic gadgets necessary for their missions. Our army runs on electricity. Unfortunately, sustaining necessary amounts
of electricity is difficult, as illustrated by the above fuel statistic. The capability to generate and sustain required
electrical energy is currently the Army’s most critical energy vulnerability. Without electricity, the Army simply cannot
operate. As long as the Army struggles
to provide sufficient electrical generation, or has to rely on outside sources
for its electricity, it remains vulnerable.
The primary vulnerabilities include a reliance on often unreliable civil
power infrastructure, a reliance on petroleum fuel for operational and
expeditionary power generation, and a reliance on weight-intensive battery
power which overburdens the warfighter.
The Army must address these vulnerabilities, whether through electrical
self-reliance initiatives or emerging technologies.
What TOCs used to look like
What TOCs look like now
The Army differentiates its energy
requirements by dividing them into two categories: operational energy, which is
“the energy and associated systems, information and processes required to
train, move and sustain forces and systems for military operations,” and
garrison energy, which is “the energy required to power Army bases and conduct
Soldier training.”[3] While they may differ in their outcomes, both
operational and garrison energy are strikingly similar in requirements,
especially when it comes to electrical energy.
Whether operational or garrison, the Army requires electrical energy to
power its infrastructure. This
infrastructure includes necessary command systems networked across the globe
between “garrison” training locations and “operational” forward headquarters. It includes the power necessary for housing
and sustaining the soldiers and families of Fort Irwin, as well as the power
necessary for housing and sustaining the joint force and contractors at Bagram
Air Base. It includes the energy needed
to charge the Fort Bragg Military Police’s trunked radio network as well as the
energy needed to charge Able Company, 1-506 IN’s tactical radios at COP Yahyah
Kheyl, Afghanistan. Whether needed for garrison or facility infrastructure,
major systems, or for powering a soldier’s PVS-14s, the Army either has to
generate that energy itself, or rely on an outside party for its generation.
Currently the Army relies on
established power grids, mechanical power generation and battery power to meet
its needs. For “garrison” or “enduring
infrastructure” power needs, the Army ties in to local power grids, often
relying on the local civil power infrastructure. Depending on the location of the
installation, this power could come from a number of sources and could be at
any state of functionality. While the
Army is moving towards energy independence for garrison power needs, the
current method of electrical redundancy remains the use of back-up emergency
generators, designed for only short-term use to power critical systems and capabilities.
Mechanical power generation refers
to the use of combustion type engines and generators to produce electrical
power. This is the primary power
generation method employed towards “operational” energy needs for systems and
mobile infrastructure, and is almost entirely dependent on petroleum fuels. Petroleum fuels have several shortcomings,
including their non-renewable nature, the large amount of fuel needed to
generate power, and the constant need to transport fuel from depot to end user. The transportation of fuel to operational
locations is costly in both blood and treasure, with over 3,000 personnel
killed transporting fuel between 2003 and 2007.[4] In addition to security concerns, simple
variables such as weather and terrain affect the Army’s ability to deliver fuel
to users to ensure electrical power.
For soldiers and their individual
systems, generators and power grids cannot be carried around the battlefield,
and are therefore not an option when conducting operations. Today’s soldier carries a significant amount
of electronics, and relies on battery power to ensure those electronics are
functioning.[5] But batteries, like power grids and
generators, have significant limitations.
While some batteries are rechargeable, a separate power source is
required to complete a recharge. Most
batteries remain single-use, and often electronics drain battery power
completely after more than 6-8 hours of usage, causing the soldier to carry
back-up batteries. As well, batteries
are subject to environmental conditions, with extreme cold and heat diminishing
battery life. Most importantly, though,
is the problem of battery weight and soldier fighting loads:[6]
Compared to
aircraft or ground vehicles, for example, a Warfighter on a three-day foot
patrol in Afghanistan has a relatively small demand for energy, but that demand
has been growing. Today, that Warfighter may carry more than 33 batteries, weighing
up to 10 pounds, to power critical gear. By 2012, battery loads for the same
mission are projected to increase to more than 50 batteries per soldier,
weighing nearly 18 lbs.[7]
According to guidelines in ADRP
3-90, the more a soldier’s fighting load exceeds 30 percent of bodyweight, the
less effective the soldier becomes in combat, especially past 45 percent
bodyweight, or approximately 72 pounds[8]. Thus, a soldier’s batteries may comprise as
much as 25 to 50 percent of his total fighting load. As we add new technologies and new systems,
this load will likely only increase, while the load bearing capacity of the
soldier will only remain static.
How many more toys can we fit on this soldier?
The demand for technology-based
operations is entrenched within the Army, and rightfully so. Current and developing technologies enhance
the Army’s inherent capabilities and give it a significant battlefield
overmatch over adversaries. But
installations dependent on civil electrical infrastructure are vulnerable to
natural outages, attacks on critical power infrastructure and even local and
regional economic considerations.[9] Operationally, should an enemy be able to
interdict supply routes and convoys, or even destroy operational fuel storage
facilities, the Army would be significantly degraded in its ability to conduct
operations.[10] Finally, the operational effectiveness of the
Army ultimately resides in the ability of the soldier to close with and destroy
the enemy. If our soldiers are carrying
fighting loads of over 45 percent bodyweight, a quarter of which is batteries,
their effectiveness in closing with and destroying the enemy is dramatically
degraded and the risk of soldier loss is dramatically increased.
The Army is coming to terms with its
dependence on electrical energy, and recognizes the serious vulnerability
presented by that dependence. While
there is no single set of solutions available to completely rid the Army of its
energy vulnerability, there are several options available which can significantly
mitigate that vulnerability. Regarding
garrison and infrastructure energy requirements, the Army is moving towards a
“Net Zero” goal which would make installations fully self-sufficient through
the use of self-contained micro grids, developing solar technologies, and even
potential nuclear power options.[11] At some installations such as Ft. Irwin, Ft.
Bliss and Ft. Hood, the Army has made significant investments in solar
technologies as a means of achieving electrical self-sufficiency.[12] For
operational systems and infrastructure, the Army is evaluating similar
alternatives, including solar-energy-generating coatings for equipment and
waste-to-energy processes.[13] For soldier power solutions, the Army is also
evaluating solar technologies as well as thermoelectric and motion-induction
alternatives, as well as developing lighter and better battery technologies.[14] Throughout the next decade the Army will
likely see advancements in electrical generation technologies, but will
doubtfully see significant benefit until the 2020s and into the 2030s. Until then, the Army will continue to expend
vast resources to protect and ensure its electrical energy sources, whether
they be regional power grids or petroleum fuel sources and volatile supply lines,
and ask its soldiers to bear ever-increasing loads of batteries; because the
Army knows that without that electricity, it will not function.
[1] Army Capabilities Integration Center
(ARCIC), US ArmyPower and Energy StrategyWhite Paper (US Army Research, Development and Engineering Command, Ft.
Monroe, VA, 2010) 2.
[2] While the number given here is
deployed servicemembers versus deployed soldiers, the comparison is arguably
still valid. The amount of electricity
required to support a deployed sailor versus that required to support the
deployed soldier sitting next to him in a joint TOC is equal. Deployed troop numbers as reported to
Congress, see Amy Belasco, Troop Levelsin the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues,
(Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C, 2009) 9, Table 1.
[3] The United States Army 2012 Posture Statement (Headquarters, United
States Army, 2012) 9.
[4] Energy for the Warfighter: Operational Energy Strategy (US
Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 2011) 5.
[5] See Steve Mapes, Soldier Power to the Edge (US Army, PM
Soldier, PEO Soldier, 2012) 9.
[8]
Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-90, Offense and Defense (US Army Training and Doctrine
Command, Ft. Monroe, VA, 2012) 3-11, Paragraph 3-65.
[11] See the Samuel Booth, et al, Net Zero Energy Military Installations: AGuide to Assessment and Planning (US Department of Energy, National
Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2010); for a more in-depth look at possible net
zero energy solutions, see ARCIC, US ArmyPower and Energy Strategy White Paper, 12.
[12] The Ft. Irwin solar power system
is still under development and anticipated to begin producing electricity this
year, with an expected output of over 500MW, see Fort Irwin Solar Energy Enhanced Use Lease Fact Sheet (US Army
Corps of Engineers and Clark Energy Group, 2011);. Fort Bliss and Fort Hood are taking smaller
measures, installing solar panels throughout the installations. See Kate
Galbraith, At Fort Bliss and Fort HoodGoing Solar for Net Zero Energy Production (New York Times, 26 April, 2012).
[13] ARCIC, US Army Power and Energy Strategy White Paper, 12.
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